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Abstract: 
In a list exchange (LE), the intended recipient in an incompatible pair receives priority on the 
deceased donor waitlist (DD-waitlist) after the paired incompatible donor donates a kidney to a 
DD-waitlist candidate. A non-directed donor’s (ND-D) kidney is usually transplanted directly to 
a DD-waitlist candidate. These two established practices would help even more transplant 
candidates if they were integrated with kidney paired donation (KPD).  
We consider a scenario in which the donor of an LE intended recipient (LE-IR) donates to a 
compatible KPD intended recipient (KPD-IR), and the KPD donor (KPD-D) donates to the 
waitlist (an LE-chain). We consider a similar scenario in which an ND-D donates to a KPD-IR 
and the KPD-D donates to the DD-waitlist (an ND-chain).  
Using data derived from the New England Program for Kidney Exchange (NEPKE) and from 
OPTN/SRTR recipient-donor distributions, simulations are presented to evaluate the potential 
impact of chain exchanges coordinated with KPD. LE donors (LE-D) and ND-D who are ABO-
O result in the highest number of additional transplants, while results for ABO-A and B donors 
are similar to each other. We recommend that both LE and ND donations be utilized through 
chain exchanges. 
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1. Introduction: 
Live donors are an increasing source of kidney transplants. Usually live donations are 
directed, meaning there is a named intended recipient of a kidney donated by a relative, friend, or 
spouse. However, ABO blood incompatibility or a positive crossmatch prevents some of these 
intended transplants from being performed. 
 
Recently, several kidney exchange or kidney paired donation (KPD) programs have 
been established [1-4]. In a two-way KPD, two incompatible pairs exchange donor kidneys so 
one KPD-IR receives the kidney of the other KPD-D [5]. Three-way exchanges, in which three 
pairs participate, can also be utilized. To expand the opportunity for KPD, optimal matching 
algorithms were designed to identify maximal sets of compatible donor/recipient pairs from a 
registry of incompatible pairs [6-8]. These protocols are currently used in NEPKE, the regional 
exchange program in UNOS Region 1 [9]. 
 
To increase access to kidney transplantation for some candidates, the New England 
region conducts UNOS approved list exchanges (LE). In an LE, a living incompatible donor 
(LE-D) provides a kidney to a candidate on the DD-waitlist and in return the LE-IR receives a 
“priority” on the DD-waitlist [10]. Through April, 2006, 24 have been performed. Participants in 
the LE in New England must be candidates for a first deceased donor kidney, be unsensitized 
(PRA <10%) and on dialysis [1].  
 
There is debate in the transplantation community about ethical issues concerning list 
exchange. The apparent adverse effect of LE on blood-type O recipients with no live donors is 
well analyzed [11]. However the full potential benefits of LE have not been investigated as 
thoroughly. We will demonstrate that integrating LE and KPD benefits additional candidates 
without any further adverse effect on O candidates on the DD-waitlist. 
 
Another source of live-kidney donations is non-directed altruistic donors (ND-D). [12]. 
The number of ND-Ds has been increasing (20 in 2000, 56 in 2002, 79 in 2005) according to 
OPTN data (retrieved from http://www.optn.org on 3/23/2006). In most cases, an ND-D kidney 
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is transplanted to the highest priority appropriate candidate on the DD-waitlist, as described in a 
UNOS bioethics white paper (Allocation of Organs From Non-Directed Living Donors, at 
http://www.unos.org/resources/bioethics.asp?index=9). 
 
In this paper, we determine if integrating KPD with LE and ND-D can increase the 
number of individuals who receive a transplant, as suggested by Roth, Sönmez and Ünver [6]. 
The potential gains are analyzed by doing simulations with anonymous data sets from New 
England, which include pairs on the NEPKE list, pairs who participated in LE, and an ND-D 
whose donation was integrated with NEPKE. The results from simulations using OPTN/SRTR 
data are also presented.   
 
2. Methods: 
 
I. Definition of LE-chain and ND-chain Exchanges: 
An LE-chain exchange involves at least two pairs, one willing to participate in LE and a 
second willing to participate in KPD. The LE-IR gets a priority on the DD-waitlist, the LE-D 
donates to the KPD-IR, and the KPD-D donates to the DD-waitlist. LE-chain exchanges in which 
more than one additional pair participates can also be considered (see Figure 1). Instead of only 
helping one candidate receive a transplant, i.e. the LE-IR in a traditional list exchange, an LE-
chain exchange can help two or more candidates (the LE-IR, and at least one KPD-IR). We 
concentrate primarily on LE-chains of length no more than 2, or no more than 3, for the same 
logistical considerations that cause KPD to involve 2 or sometimes 3 pairs.  
 
In an ND-chain exchange, the ND-D would donate to the KPD-IR instead of to a DD-
waitlist candidate. In return the KPD-D would donate to a waitlist candidate. An ND-chain 
exchange is very similar to a LE-chain exchange, only the chain starts with an ND-D instead of a 
LE pair. There can be more than one pair in an ND-chain exchange (see Figure 2). This idea was 
first applied by Johns Hopkins University Hospital Transplant Center, where an ND-chain 
exchange including two pairs was conducted in May 2005 (D. Segev, personal communication).  
Simulations regarding ND-chains and LE-chains are very similar, so it is straightforward 
to draw conclusions using the same simulations for both ND-chains and LE-chains.  
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II. Simulations Using Local Data Sets 
NEPKE Data Set: 
The NEPKE data set involved 34 distinct KPD-IRs and their incompatible live donors 
who registered for KPD through April 28, 2006. Anonymous data were provided by NEPKE and 
included ABO and HLA types, and HLA antibody screening data (PRA and antibody 
specificity). One KPD-IR had 3 paired-donors, one had 2, and the rest had 1 paired-donor each. 
These KPD-IRs and their donors registered over time and some withdrew from the list for 
various reasons, but all pairs were included in this study. 
 
Five of the NEPKE pairs participated in LEs so they were considered only in the LE data 
set. Seven KPD-IRs did not have HLA class II antibody screen data available and were excluded, 
so the eventual NEPKE data set included 22 KPD-IRs. Eight (36.3%) were highly sensitized, 
with overall PRA greater than 70%. Six (27.3%) had PRA <10%, and the rest (8/22) were 
moderately sensitized. The high percentage of sensitized IRs can be attributed to the increased 
likelihood that such individuals have incompatible donors. Thirteen of 22 (59.1%) were ABO-O, 
six (27.3%) ABO-A and three (13.6%) ABO-B. Of the 25 donors, ten were (45.45%) ABO-O, 
seven (31.8%) ABO-B, seven (31.8%) ABO-A and one (4.5%) ABO-AB. 
 
New England LE Pairs and ND-Ds: 
The LE data consisted of 24 pairs who had received a kidney transplant using the LE. 
These included 15 pairs with ABO-O IRs and ABO-A donors (O-A blood types), 1 pair with O-
O, 5 pairs with O-B, 2 pairs with O-AB and 1 pair with A-B blood types. The O-O blood type 
pair is unusual in the LE since sensitized candidates are excluded, but this donor was unsuitable 
for reasons other than ABO or crossmatch. In addition to the LE pairs, one ND-D (ABO-O) who 
was willing to donate a kidney as part of an ND-chain is included.  
 
Local Data Simulations: 
Integration of LE pairs and ND-D with NEPKE 
In the first set of simulations, the compatibility matrix (i.e. which IRs were compatible 
with which donors) was determined. Compatibility was based on ABO and predicted crossmatch 
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results [13]. IRs who would potentially be able to receive a transplant through KPD were 
identified using optimization techniques previously described [7, 13, 14]. Integer programming 
was used to determine maximal unrestricted exchanges and maximal two-and-three-way 
exchanges, and Edmonds’ algorithm [15] was used to determine maximal two-way exchanges, as 
previously explained [7, 14].  
 
To measure the marginal impact of an LE pair or the ND-D, they were introduced one at a time 
to the NEPKE pool. This results in simulations where the numbers of LE or ND-Ds are relatively 
small compared to the KPD pool. Maximal exchanges in each of the three exchange regimens 
together with the potential LE-chain exchange were computed. For each regimen the marginal 
impact of each LE pair and the ND-D was calculated by finding how many additional IRs in the 
NEPKE pool were matched in the presence of an LE pair or the ND-D  
 
In summary, three computational experiments were simulated to answer the following 
questions:  
What is the marginal impact of a LE-chain/ND-chain exchange on the NEPKE pool when 
Experiment 1. each exchange and chain can involve an unrestricted number of transplants? 
Experiment 2.  each exchange and chain can involve two or three transplants? 
Experiment 3. each exchange or chain can involve only two transplants? 
 
Integration of Random ND-Ds 
 In the second set of simulations, the number of additional transplants possible by 
introducing randomly generated ND-Ds (denoted only by blood type) in the NEPKE pool was 
evaluated. We simulated positive crossmatch probability using PRA levels of the KPD-IR as 
previously described [13]. Monte Carlo simulations (which find averages and standard deviations 
by simulating the model with randomly generated samples) of 500 ND-D were run for each 
blood type. These simulations were also used to draw conclusions about the impact of randomly 
generated LE pairs on the NEPKE pool. 
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III. OPTN/SRTR Data and Simulating Chain Exchanges  
Additional simulations were conducted based on data from the OPTN/SRTR 2003 
Annual Report (retrieved from http://www.optn.org on 11/22/2004). These simulations were 
conducted to determine the potential benefits of integrating ND donations with KPDs in a more 
representative data set for the US kidney transplant population, and in larger KPD pools. 
Conclusions about integrating LE pairs with KPD can also be drawn from these simulations. 
 
Generation of simulated pairs 
Distributions of (simulated) donor and IR blood types and gender, PRA distribution, and 
frequency of spousal donations were obtained from OPTN/SRTR data. (IR characteristics from 
the new waitlist registrations data, living donor relational type distribution from living donor 
transplants data).  
 
Data generation assumptions were similar to simulations previously described [9, 13]. 
Pairs were randomly generated (assuming one donor per IR). Probability of a positive 
crossmatch was based on IR PRA data. A pair was included in the sample population if the IR 
and donor were incompatible by blood type or crossmatch. Incompatible pairs were generated 
until a sample pool size of n (n=25, 50 or 100) was reached. Monte-Carlo simulation of 500 
random populations was used for each sample pool size. Once the incompatible pairs were 
generated, the matching algorithms described for the NEPKE data simulations were used to 
determine maximal sets of exchanges in the same three experiments. ND-Ds with each of the 4 
blood types were introduced to the pool one at a time to measure their marginal impact.  
 
Two separate simulations were conducted using the same data generating assumptions as 
in Saidman et al [13]. For simplicity in the first simulation, IRs and their donors were assumed to 
be blood type unrelated (Table 1). In the second simulation, additional assumptions as in Zenios 
et al [11] were used. Each IR was assumed to have 0 or 1 spouse, 0,1 or 2 parents, and 0 or 1 
siblings as suitable donors (leading to 12 different donor configurations). Each of the 
configurations could occur with equal probability. In both simulations, all characteristics of IRs 
and donors were independently drawn from their respective distributions.  
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Simulations integrating LE with KPD 
To draw conclusions about the impact of integrating LE with KPD, the same set of 
simulations for ND-chain exchanges as described for NEPKE data were used. These simulations 
show the effects of integrating LE-chain exchanges for each LE-D blood type.  
 
Distribution of LE-D and LE-IR ABO blood groups 
Both ND-chains and LE-chains result in a different donor, possibly with a different blood 
group, being available for a DD-waitlist candidate instead of the original ND-D or LE-D.  
Simulations to estimate the distribution for LE-D (and LE-IR) blood groups when LE-chains (or 
ND-D chains) are incorporated were run using two methods. In the first, a hypothetical exchange 
program that made all LE pairs initially only available for two-way KPD was used. Each two-
way KPD match run was conducted after 25 pairs entered the KPD pool. The pairs that remained 
unmatched became available for a second two-way match run when 25 more pairs were added to 
the pool. Third and fourth two-way KPD match runs were continued in a similar fashion. Pairs 
with unsensitized IR from the initial pool (with the initial 25 LE pairs) who remained unmatched 
after the fourth match run were only then considered eligible for LE. A Monte-Carlo simulation 
of 500 such groups gave the distribution of the LE-IR and LE-D blood groups.  
 
In the second method, blood group distribution was generated using blood groups of the 
24 New England LE pairs. These two distributions were generated for each of the two 
simulations described above, i.e. for IRs with single or with potentially multiple blood-related 
donors.  
 
In simulations with potentially multiple donors for an IR, one of the donors was chosen to 
be sent to a DD-waitlist candidate (if that IR was the last person in an LE-chain exchange) either 
randomly or selectively. In the selective choice, an ABO-O donor was first choice if available. 
Second choice was ABO-B, then ABO-A and finally an ABO-AB donor. The hierarchy in the 
selective choice was based first on the desire to maximize O donors, and then on the median 
waiting times of different blood type candidates on the DD-waitlist. 
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In summary, four distributions for the LE-IR and LE-D blood types were generated 
(Table 2). These were for (1) single donor simulations (2) multiple donor simulations with 
randomly chosen LE-D (3) multiple donor simulations with selectively chosen LE-D, and (4) the 
New England LE data Using these distributions, the blood-types of donors sent to the DD-
waitlist, average impact of an LE pair on helping other candidates when LE-chain exchanges are 
integrated with KPD, and the blood-types of the LE-IRs who receive priority on the DD-waitlist 
were estimated. 
 
3. Results 
I. New England Data Simulation 
In the NEPKE dataset, 6 pairs out of 22 could be matched through maximal two-way 
exchanges, and also under maximal two-and-three-way exchanges or maximal unrestricted 
exchanges.  
 
Table 3 shows how many additional pairs would benefit from integrating LE-chain 
exchange with KPD when each LE pair joins the NEPKE pool one by one. When the LE-D is 
ABO-A, 1 additional KPD-IR benefits in this limited population. But when the LE-D is ABO-O, 
as many as 5 additional KPD-IRs can receive transplants. Finally when the LE-D is ABO-B, no 
additional KPD-IR can receive a transplant. These numbers are in addition to one LE-IR who 
receives priority on the DD-waitlist, one waitlist candidate who receives transplant through the 
LE-chain and 6 KPD-IR who already can receive transplants through two-way exchanges.  
 
Similar to integrating an ABO-O LE-D, integrating the ND-D with ABO-O with NEPKE 
under the three experiments considered would benefit 5, 2 and 1 additional pairs respectively. 
This is in addition to the DD-waitlist candidate who always benefits from ND-chain exchanges. 
 
In the second set of simulations, random simulated ND-Ds were introduced to the 
NEPKE pool one at a time (Table 4). When exchanges are unrestricted, an ABO-O ND-D would 
help on average 5.25 additional KPD-IRs to receive kidneys; an ABO-A donor would help 3.25; 
whereas a B or AB donor would not help any additional KPD-IRs. When exchanges (including 
ND-chain exchanges) are two-and-three way (Table 4, Experiment 2) or only two-way (Table 4, 
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Experiment 3), maximum possible gains are obtained by an ABO-O ND-D facilitating 2 and 1 
additional transplants respectively. The number of additional transplants falls to 1.45 and 1, 
respectively for an ABO-A ND-D. 
 
The results can be generalized for simulated LE pairs. Table 4 results would still apply if 
random simulated LE pairs with ABO-O, A, B or AB donors were considered instead of ND-Ds. 
 
The cost of LE in terms of missed KPD opportunities was also studied. All LE pairs were 
added to the NEPKE pool, resulting in 46 pairs. 8, 9 or 11 pairs could be matched through two-
way, two and three-way, or unrestricted exchanges respectively. However, the additional benefit 
of KPD for LE-IRs was due entirely to the ABO-O LE-D. If this unusual pair was excluded from 
KPD, then only 6 of the remaining 45 pairs could be matched in any size exchanges. This is the 
same number matched through KPD in the original 22 pair pool. Only one of 23 LE pairs could 
participate in an exchange, and only at the expense of one of the NEPKE pairs who originally 
could have been matched. 
  
II. Simulation with OPTN/SRTR Data 
Results of the OPTN/SRTR data simulations are in Tables 5-9. Tables 5-6 show results of 
simulations involving KPD-IRs with single unrelated donors and Tables 7-8 show results of 
simulations involving KPD-IRs with multiple donors. Results for single donor simulations are 
summarized here.  
 
Table 5 shows the number of additional transplants from integrating ND-chain and KPD 
exchanges. For pool size n=100, about 60 pairs are matched through unrestricted exchanges or 
two-and-three-way exchanges, and about 50 pairs are matched through two-way paired 
exchanges. If a single ABO-O ND-D is introduced to the exchange pool, approximately 2, 1.9, 
and 1 additional transplants could occur when exchange and chain size is unrestricted 
(Experiment 1), two-and-three-way (Experiment 2), and two-way (Experiment 3), respectively. 
Therefore, an ABO-O ND-D helps (almost) the maximum feasible number of additional IRs in 
experiments 2 and 3. Note that these numbers are in addition to a DD-waitlist candidate who 
receives a transplant through the ND-chain. If the ND-D is ABO-A, 0.96-1 additional pairs are 
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matched. If the ND-D is ABO-B, 0.83-0.89 additional pairs are matched. Under all scenarios, 
ABO-AB ND-Ds rarely help any additional pairs receive transplants, since it is rare that a KPD-
IR is ABO-AB and is incompatible with her own donor.  
 
As the pair pool size decreases below 100, additional benefit of A and B blood-type 
donors slightly decreases for all experiments. However, as a percentage of the pool size, all ND-
chain exchanges have higher marginal effect in smaller pools.  
 
The results for ND-chain exchanges are used to draw conclusions regarding LE-chain 
exchanges. Table 6 summarizes the gains from LE-chain exchanges and distribution of the 
blood-type of the donor kidney sent to the DD-waitlist when LE-chain exchanges are integrated 
through KPD, as compared to when LE is conducted independently of KPD.  
 
Integration of LE-chain exchanges with KPD benefits 0.77 to 1 additional pairs under the 
three experiments. But the donor kidney sent to the waitlist is more likely to be ABO-AB 
compared to ordinary LE. In two-way exchange (Experiment 3), ABO-AB donors are sent to the 
waitlist less frequently than in other experiments. Also in this experiment, occasional ABO-O 
donors are sent to the waitlist while none are sent under other experiments, and ABO-A and B 
donors are sent to the waitlist more frequently than in other experiments.  
 
The effect of the LE alone on the blood type of the donor kidney sent to the waitlist is at 
the bottom of Table 6. The major difference between LE alone and LE-chain exchanges is that 
ABO-A donors are sent to the DD-waitlist less frequently under LE-chain exchanges (but instead 
AB blood type donors are sent), and occasional ABO-O kidneys can be sent under the LE-chain 
exchanges, while no O donors are sent under LE alone. 
 
Table 7 shows the magnitudes of the additional benefits slightly increase for KPD-IRs 
with multiple donors for all experiments (except the marginal benefit of O blood-type ND-D 
under 2-way exchanges). Table 8 gives the distributions of the blood types of donors sent to the 
waitlist when donors are chosen randomly.. Choosing donors selectively results in slightly more 
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O, A and B blood type donors and fewer AB blood type donors being sent to the DD-waitlist 
(data not shown). 
 
The distribution of the blood type of the average LE-IR in the single donor simulations is 
shown in Table 9 for both LE and LE-chain exchanges (average with respect to distribution (1)). 
Mostly ABO-O IRs receive priority on the DD-waitlist under both LE and LE-chain exchanges 
as expected and predicted by previous studies (11). The blood type distributions of the LE-IRs in 
the multiple donor simulations are also shown (averages with respect to distributions (2) and (3)) 
and are similar to the single donor simulation results (i.e. most of the LE-IRs have O blood type). 
 
Discussion: 
KPD is widely accepted as an ethical procedure [16, 17]. LE is more controversial, but is 
utilized in New England with UNOS approval. ND-Ds are rare but numbers are increasing. In 
this paper, we propose two ways of increasing the benefits of LE and ND-D through chain 
exchanges integrated with KPD.  
 
A chain exchange involves at least one additional pair besides the original LE pair or 
ND-D. In a chain exchange, instead of the first donor (LE-D or ND-D) directly donating to a 
waitlist candidate, the kidney is donated to a KPD-IR and in return the KPD-D donates to the 
DD-waitlist. Longer chain exchanges involving more pairs can also be feasible. We conducted 
simulations using both local data and OPTN/SRTR data to see the potential benefits of chain 
exchanges. The benefits of this integration with KPD are largest for ABO-O blood-type donors 
(ND-D or LE-D), but are also significant with ABO-A or B donors (although in the small local 
sample, an ABO-B or AB donor did not help any IRs). 
 
However LE and ND chain exchanges differ in their impact on the DD waitlist due to the 
difference in the ABO blood type distributions of the ND-Ds and the LE-Ds.  The blood types of 
the ND-Ds are the same as the blood type distribution of the general population. In contrast, the 
blood type distribution of the LE-Ds almost never includes ABO-O donors.  
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How donations from ND-D should be utilized is currently at the discretion of donors. In 
Region 1, ND-D are offered the option to either donate directly to a candidate on the DD-waitlist 
at a transplant center they choose, or to integrate their donation into NEPKE. A single ABO-O 
ND-D who has indicated a willingness to integrate his/her donation with the NEPKE list has the 
potential to allow an additional two transplants. These transplants have been proposed and donor 
workups and crossmatches are in progress. Better utilization of their gift through ND-chain 
exchange may even result in an increased motivation for ND-Ds and thus more live donor 
kidneys may be donated to the DD-waitlist.  
 
In an LE-chain exchange, the effect on the DD-waitlist will be similar to that of LE and 
will not affect the number of kidneys donated to the DD-waitlist. However, as currently happens 
in LE, mostly blood type O kidneys will be received from the DD waitlist and fewer blood type 
O kidneys will be donated in return. So the distributional impact of an LE-chain to ABO-O 
recipients with no live donors is similar to that of an LE.  
 
Ross and Zenios [18] suggested that restricting LE to ABO incompatible IR with ABO-
A, B and AB bood types, and to recipients with an ABO-compatible but crossmatch 
incompatible living donor, would be fairer . Under this proposal, ABO-O deceased donors would 
not be diverted from ABO-O candidates. However the authors acknowledge that such restrictions 
do not allow for the maximum number of possible transplants. They also require that sensitized 
recipients be allowed to participate in LE, which is currently not allowed in Region 1.  
 
Other ethical objections were reported by Ackerman et al [19], who showed that 40% of 
minority candidates surveyed did not feel that LE was fair if ABO-O waitlist candidates had to 
wait any longer for a deceased donor organ. However, Morrissey has argued in support of LE 
[20]. He notes that Region 1 has acknowledged the disadvantage for ABO-O waitlist candidates, 
but suggests that the small disadvantage from the limited number of LE pairs presented in the 
region so far has been offset by the addition of live donors to the pool of candidates awaiting 
deceased donor transplants. Simulations have shown that LE is the best way to increase living 
donation among small groups of recipients, but as incompatible population size increases to 
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greater than 100 pairs, LE offered less benefit than KPD [21]. However, the added beneficial 
effect of integrating LE and KPD was not fully considered in that study.  
 
The utilization of LE-chains is likely to inherit the ethical concerns raised regarding LE 
[11]. However, an LE donor will rarely be ABO-O, but in an LE-chain the blood type of the 
donor sent to the DD-waitlist may sometimes be ABO-O depending on the pairs participating. 
Therefore, in general the overall effect of an LE-chain exchange will not be worse than list 
exchange alone regarding any disadvantage to ABO-O candidates on the DD waitlist, and may 
sometimes be better. Also, the ethical concerns might be somewhat alleviated since unlike LE, 
an LE-chain benefits more than one recipient on the paired exchange pool. There will be few or 
no missed KPD opportunities due to pairs who opt for LE if no LE-chain exchanges are possible.  
 
Moreover, while this is not the current practice in New England, it has been proposed that 
LE-chains might be utilized selectively [6] to avoid any adverse affect on the ABO-O DD-
waitlist by avoiding LE-chain exchanges where the net effect to the ABO-O DD-waitlist is 
negative. That would mean an ABO-O KPD-IR would receive priority at the DD-waitlist only if 
the donor whose kidney is donated to the DD-waitlist via the LE-chain exchange is of blood–
type O. However, this may not allow for the maximum number of transplants to occur.  
 
In the current practice of KPD, all transplants are conducted simultaneously, which 
makes larger exchanges logistically more demanding. Nevertheless the benefits of three-way 
exchange over two-way exchange are well documented [13, 14].  Similar limitations are required 
for LE-chain exchanges. In a two pair LE-chain exchange, the two transplants would normally be 
conducted simultaneously. As with KPD, it may be difficult to conduct a LE-chain involving 
more than three pairs. 
 
But such a limitation in exchange sizes may not be required for ND-chain exchanges. It 
may not be necessary to conduct all exchanges simultaneously, since the first donation comes 
from an ND donor. If something goes wrong in subsequent transplants and the whole ND-chain 
cannot be completed, the worst outcome will be no donated kidney being sent to the waitlist and 
 15 
the ND donation would entirely benefit the KPD pool. This will likely be a subject of debate 
should ND-chain exchanges become more prevalent. 
 
We recommend that both LE and ND-Ds be integrated with KPD. Our simulations 
clearly support this position. In New England, pairs who are eligible for LE under the strict 
criteria established by the region are required to remain in the NEPKE pool for at least 45 days 
(an arbitrarily chosen time requirement) before opting out for LE. This can facilitate new KPD in 
addition to LE-chain exchanges. In either case, additional IRs may be helped. Similarly ND-Ds 
are given the opportunity to have their donation utilized through NEPKE (if possible) with the 
understanding that their gift may then help even more individuals receive a kidney transplant.  
 
There is growing consensus in the medical community on the need for a national KPD 
program in the US to coordinate paired exchanges. Benefits of larger pools for KPD are well 
established [8, 13, 14]. There has also been discussion of enlarging the set of pairs eligible for 
exchange to include some compatible pairs (9, 22). We propose that at least ND-chain exchanges 
should be incorporated in such a program to maximize the benefits of KPD. This would be an 
opportunity to help more transplant candidates in every region in the country. Interested regions 
(as in New England) could also integrate LE-chain exchanges with their current systems and 
transplant even more living donor kidneys.  
 
 
Acknowledgement: We thank Ruthanne Hanto of NEPKE and the New England Organ 
Bank for valuable assistance and insightful comments. 
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Table 1: The ABO distribution of kidney paired donation intended recipient (IR)-donor (D) pairs 
obtained in single donor simulations (n=100)  
  
IR-D 
blood types 
ABO 
Distribution 
O-O 11.36% 
O-A 30.71% 
O-B 13.09% 
O-AB 3.50% 
A-O 7.57% 
A-A 5.46% 
A-B 9.33% 
A-AB 2.43% 
B-O 3.34% 
B-A 9.28% 
B-B 1.03% 
B-AB 1.04% 
AB-O 0.92% 
AB-A 0.64% 
AB-B 0.25% 
AB-AB 0.066% 
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Table 2: The distribution of list exchange intended recipient (LE-IR) and list exchange donor 
(LE-D) blood types calculated according to the four distribution generation processes 
 
Single Donor 
Simulations 
(Distribution 1) 
Multiple Donor 
Simulations - 
randomly 
chosen LE-D 
(Distribution 2) 
Multiple Donor 
Simulations - 
selectively 
chosen LE-D 
(Distribution 3) 
NE-LE pairs 
(Distribution 4) 
LE-
IR 
blood 
types 
O 89.53% 88.64% 95.83% 
A 6.64% 5.89% 4.17% 
B 3.83% 5.47% 0.00% 
AB 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
LE-D 
blood 
types 
O 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 4.17% 
A 57.27% 64.40% 59.73% 62.50% 
B 25.67% 23.45% 29.29% 25.00% 
AB 17.06% 12.15% 10.99% 8.33% 
NE: New England;  LE: list exchange 
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Table 3.  Number of additional transplants resulting from integrating LE-chain exchanges with 
paired exchanges using New England list exchange and NEPKE databases. The impact of 
integrating the O blood group non-directed donor is the same as that of the single O blood group 
LE-D shown in the first row.  
   
Marginal Impact of LE pairs 
LE-IR 
blood 
type 
LE-D 
blood 
Type 
Number of 
LE pairs of 
these types 
Additionally matched in the NEPKE pool due to a LE pair 
EXPERIMENT 1 EXPERIMENT 2 EXPERIMENT 3 
When unrestricted 
number of transplants 
can occur in an 
exchange or chain 
When at most three 
transplants are 
permitted in an 
exchange or chain 
When at most two 
transplants are 
permitted in an 
exchange or chain 
O O 1 5 2 1 
O A 15 1 1 1 
O B 5 0 0 0 
O AB 2 0 0 0 
A B 1 0 0 0 
NEPKE: New England Program for Kidney Exchange;  LE: list exchange; LE-D: List exchange donor; LE-IR: List exchange intended recipient. 
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Table 4.  Number of additional transplants resulting from integrating ND-chain exchanges 
with kidney paired donation (KPD) in the NEPKE database using random ND-D. In all three 
cases, only 6 intended recipients can be matched in the NEPKE database through KPD only. 
 
 
Additionally 
matched 
due to an O 
blood-type 
ND-D  
Additionally 
matched 
due to an A 
blood-type 
ND-D  
Additionally 
matched 
due to a B 
blood-type 
ND-D  
Additionally 
matched 
due to an 
AB blood-
type ND-D  
EXPERIMENT 1 
When unrestricted number of transplants can occur in an 
exchange or chain 
Average 5.25 3.25 0 0 
Std Dev 0.87 2.49 0 0 
EXPERIMENT 2  
When at most three transplants are permitted in an exchange or 
chain 
Average 2 1.45 0 0 
Std Dev 0 0.50 0 0 
EXPERIMENT 3  
When at most two transplants are permitted in an exchange or 
chain 
Average 1 1 0 0 
Std Dev 0 0 0 0 
NEPKE: New England Program for Kidney Exchange;  ND-D: non-directed donor 
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Table 5. Number of additional transplants resulting from integrating ND-chain exchanges with 
kidney paired donation (KPD) in UNOS/SRTR simulations when each intended recipient has a 
single unrelated donor. 
 
ND-D: non-directed donor;  DD: deceased donor 
 
EXPERIMENT 1 
When unrestricted number of transplants can occur in an exchange or chain 
Number 
of Pairs  
Matched 
through only 
unrestricted PE 
Additionally 
matched due 
to an O 
blood-type 
ND-D 
Additionally 
matched due 
to an A blood-
type ND-D 
Additionally 
matched due 
to a B blood-
type ND-D 
Additionally 
matched due 
to an AB 
blood-type 
ND-D 
N=25 
Average 12.37 2.04 0.77 0.70 0.04 
Std Dev 4.03 0.93 0.74 0.80 0.22 
N=50 
Average 28.36 2.02 0.85 0.71 0.05 
Std Dev 5.43 0.73 0.62 0.71 0.22 
N=100 
Average 60.38 2.03 0.96 0.83 0.056 
Std Dev 7.23 0.58 0.55 0.61 0.25 
EXPERIMENT 2 
When at most three transplants are permitted in an exchange or chain  
Number 
of Pairs  
Matched 
through only 
2&3-way PE 
Additionally 
matched due 
to an O 
blood-type 
ND-D 
Additionally 
matched due 
to an A blood-
type ND-D 
Additionally 
matched due 
to a B blood-
type ND-D 
Additionally 
matched due 
to an AB 
blood-type 
ND-D 
N=25 Average 11.63 1.82 0.85 0.71 0.03 
Std Dev 4.09 0.39 0.73 0.74 0.19 
N=50 
Average 27.60 1.87 0.90 0.77 0.02 
Std Dev 5.52 0.34 0.64 0.75 0.15 
N=100 Average 59.80 1.89 1.02 0.89 0.034 
Std Dev 7.36 0.35 0.58 0.62 0.16 
EXPERIMENT 3 
When at most two transplants are permitted in an exchange or chain 
Number 
of Pairs  
Matched 
through only 
2-way PE 
Additionally 
matched due 
to an O 
blood-type 
ND-D 
Additionally 
matched due 
to an A blood-
type ND-D 
Additionally 
matched due 
to a B blood-
type ND-D 
Additionally 
matched due 
to an AB 
blood-type 
ND-D 
N=25 Average 9.12 1 0.79 0.63 0.06 
Std Dev 3.50 0 0.41 0.48 0.23 
N=50 
Average 22.02 1 0.89 0.71 0.06 
Std Dev 5.00 0 0.31 0.46 0.24 
N=100 
Average 49.76 1 0.97 0.88 0.08 
Std Dev 6.91 0 0.22 0.36 0.27 
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Table 6. Number of additional transplants resulting from integrating LE-chains with KPD in 
UNOS/SRTR simulations when each IR has a single unrelated donor (n=100 pairs). 
Comparison of the blood type of the donors.  
 
EXPERIMENT 1  
(When unrestricted number of transplants can occur in an exchange or chain) 
 
Additional 
pairs 
matched 
Blood type of donor sent to the DD-
wait list 
O A B AB 
LE-D 
blood 
type 
O 2.03 0.00% 4.00% 5.20% 90.80% 
A 0.96 0.00% 4.80% 7.20% 88.00% 
B 0.83 0.00% 2.20% 6.80% 91.00% 
AB 0.056 0.00% 0.80% 2.80% 96.40% 
Average using simulated LE distribution (1) 0.77 0.00% 3.45% 6.35% 90.20% 
Average using NE LE pair distribution (4) 0.89 0.00% 3.78% 6.65% 89.57% 
EXPERIMENT 2 
(When at most three transplants are permitted in an exchange or chain) 
 
Additional 
pairs 
matched 
Blood type of donor sent to the DD-
wait list 
O A B AB 
LE-D 
blood 
type 
O 1.89 0.00% 8.60% 17.80% 73.60% 
A 1.02 0.00% 6.20% 8.00% 85.80% 
B 0.89 0.00% 4.00% 13.00% 83.00% 
AB 0.034 0.00% 1.20% 1.00% 97.80% 
Average using simulated LE distribution (1) 0.82 0.00% 4.78% 8.09% 87.13% 
Average using NE LE pair distribution (4) 0.94 0.00% 5.33% 9.08% 85.59% 
EXPERIMENT 3 
(When at most two transplants are permitted in an exchange or chain) 
 
Additional 
pairs 
matched 
Blood type of donor sent to the DD-
wait list 
O A B AB 
LE-D 
blood 
type 
O 1 1.20% 61.40% 29.40% 8.00% 
A 0.97 0.00% 26.00% 23.60% 50.40% 
B 0.88 0.40% 31.00% 34.60% 34.00% 
AB 0.08 0.00% 2.20% 3.20% 94.60% 
Average using simulated LE distribution (1) 0.88 0.15% 26.74% 24.89% 53.73% 
Average using NE LE pair distribution (4) 1 1.20% 61.40% 29.40% 48.22% 
List Exchange Alone 
 
Additional 
pairs 
matched 
Blood type of donor sent to the DD-
wait list 
O A B AB 
Average using simulated LE distribution (1) 0 0.00% 57.27% 25.67% 17.06% 
Average using NE LE pair distribution (4) 0 4.17% 62.50% 25.00% 8.33% 
LE-D: list exchange donor;  DD: deceased donor; IR: intended recipient 
LE distribution (1) = Distributions for LE-IR and LE-D blood types for single donor simulations 
LE distribution (4) = Distributions for LE-IR and LE-D blood types for New England LE data 
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Table 7. Number of additional transplants resulting from integrating ND-chain exchanges with 
KPD in UNOS/SRTR simulations when each IR can have multiple donors: 12 scenarios are 
considered, one IR can have 0,1, or 2 parents; and 0 or 1 sibling; and 0 or 1 spouse with equal 
probability. 
 
 
When each KPD-IR can have multiple donors 
EXPERIMENT 1  
When unrestricted number of transplants can occur in an exchange or chain 
Number 
of Pairs  
Matched 
through only 
unrestricted 
KPD 
Additionally 
matched due 
to an O 
blood-type 
ND-D 
Additionally 
matched due 
to an A blood-
type ND-D 
Additionally 
matched due 
to a B blood-
type ND-D 
Additionally 
matched due 
to an AB 
blood-type 
ND-D 
N=25 
Average 13.35 2.32 0.86 0.81 0.04 
Std Dev 3.99 1.14 0.85 0.99 0.23 
N=50 
Average 31.69 2.09 0.91 0.84 0.07 
Std Dev 5.30 0.77 0.66 0.72 0.26 
N=100 
Average 67.31 2.02 0.98 0.94 0.12 
Std Dev 7.31 0.52 0.50 0.54 0.35 
EXPERIMENT 2   
When at most three transplants are permitted in an exchange or chain 
Number 
of Pairs  
Matched 
through only 
2&3-way PE 
Additionally 
matched due 
to an O 
blood-type 
ND-D 
Additionally 
matched due 
to an A blood-
type ND-D 
Additionally 
matched due 
to a B blood-
type ND-D 
Additionally 
matched due 
to an AB 
blood-type 
ND-D 
N=25 
Average 12.18 1.87 0.86 0.75 0.03 
Std Dev 3.95 0.34 0.75 0.78 0.16 
N=50 Average 30.02 1.90 1.00 0.94 0.05 
Std Dev 5.73 0.31 0.70 0.74 0.23 
N=100 
Average 66.63 1.92 1.01 0.95 0.082 
Std Dev 7.60 0.27 0.52 0.54 0.28 
EXPERIMENT 3 
When at most two transplants are permitted in an exchange or chain 
Number 
of Pairs  
Matched 
through only 
2-way PE 
Additionally 
matched due 
to an O 
blood-type 
ND-D 
Additionally 
matched due 
to an A blood-
type ND-D 
Additionally 
matched due 
to a B blood-
type ND-D 
Additionally 
matched due 
to an AB 
blood-type 
ND-D 
N=25 
Average 9.28 1 0.75 0.58 0.04 
Std Dev 3.20 0 0.43 0.49 0.20 
N=50 Average 23.26 1 0.90 0.77 0.07 
Std Dev 5.02 0 0.31 0.42 0.25 
N=100 
Average 54.19 1 0.94 0.90 0.10 
Std Dev 7.60 0 0.22 0.29 0.31 
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Table 8. Number of additional transplants resulting from integrating LE-chain exchanges with 
KPD in UNOS/SRTR simulations when each IR can have multiple donors (for 100 pairs). 
Comparison of the blood type of the donors sent to the DD-wait list if the donor is randomly 
chosen. 
EXPERIMENT 1 
(When unrestricted number of transplants can occur in an exchange or chain) 
 
Additional 
pairs 
matched 
Blood type of donor sent to the DD-
wait list 
O A B AB 
LE-D 
blood 
type 
O 2.02 0.00% 5.40% 2.00% 92.60% 
A 0.98 0.00% 4.80% 2.00% 93.20% 
B 0.94 0.00% 4.00% 4.20% 91.80% 
AB 0.12 0.00% 0.20% 0.80% 99.00% 
Average using simulated LE distribution (2) 0.87 0.00% 4.05% 2.37% 93.58% 
Average using NE LE pair distribution (4) 0.94 0.00% 4.24% 2.45% 93.31% 
EXPERIMENT 2 
(When at most three transplants are permitted in an exchange or chain) 
 
Additional 
pairs 
matched 
Blood type of donor sent to the DD-
wait list 
O A B AB 
LE-D 
blood 
type 
O 1.92 0.00% 6.80% 9.80% 83.40% 
A 1.01 0.00% 9.80% 3.60% 86.60% 
B 0.95 0.00% 5.60% 10.40% 84.00% 
AB 0.082 0.00% 1.60% 0.40% 98.00% 
Average using simulated LE distribution (2) 0.88 0.00% 7.82% 4.81% 87.38% 
Average using NE LE pair distribution (4) 0.96 0.00% 7.94% 5.29% 86.77% 
EXPERIMENT 3 
(When at most two transplants are permitted in an exchange or chain) 
 
Additional 
pairs 
matched 
Blood type of donor sent to the DD-
wait list 
O A B AB 
LE-D 
blood 
type 
O 1 1.00% 69.00% 22.20% 7.80% 
A 0.94 0.00% 38.40% 14.80% 46.80% 
B 0.90 0.20% 37.40% 21.20% 41.20% 
AB 0.10 0.00% 2.60% 1.20% 96.20% 
Average using simulated LE distribution (2) 0.83 0.05% 33.82% 14.65% 51.49% 
Average using NE LE pair distribution (4) 0.86 0.09% 36.44% 15.58% 47.89% 
List Exchange Alone 
 
Additional 
pairs 
matched 
Blood type of donor sent to the DD 
wait list 
O A B AB 
Average using simulated LE distribution (2) 0 0.00% 64.40% 23.45% 12.15% 
Average using NE LE pair distribution (4) 0 4.17% 62.50% 25.00% 8.33% 
 
LE distribution (2) = Distributions for LE-IR and LE-D blood types for multiple donor simulations with randomly chosen LE-D 
LE distribution (4) = Distributions for LE-IR and LE-D blood types for New England LE data 
 
 24 
 
Table 9. Blood type distribution of the IRs who received priority on the DD-wait list as result of 
LE or integration of LE-chain exchanges with KPD in the SRTR/OPTN simulations. 
 
 Blood type of IR who received priority on the DD-
wait list 
O A B AB 
Average using simulated LE distribution 
(1) for simulation 1 89.53% 6.64% 3.83% 0.00% 
Average using simulated LE distribution 
(2) and (3) for simulation 2 88.64% 5.89% 5.48% 0.00% 
Average using NE LE pair distribution (4) 95.83% 4.17% 0.00% 0.00% 
 
LE distribution (1) = Distributions for LE-IR and LE-D blood types for single donor simulations 
LE distribution (2) = Distributions for LE-IR and LE-D blood types for multiple donor simulations with randomly chosen LE-D 
LE distribution (3) = Distributions for LE-IR and LE-D blood types for multiple donor simulations with selectively chosen LE-D 
LE distribution (4) = Distributions for LE-IR and LE-D blood types for New England LE data  
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Figure legends 
 
Figure 1. An LE-chain exchange with n pairs. D refers to a donor and IR refers to his/her 
intended recipient. Pairs are denoted in ellipses. IRLE---DLE is the incompatible pair who is 
willing to participate in the list exchange (LE). The other n-1 pairs come from the kidney paired 
donation (KPD) pool. Rw is a recipient on the deceased donor (DD)-wait list. Arrows show the 
resulting transplants. Example: an ABO-A living donor cannot donate to a relative who is ABO-
O. In a list exchange, the A donor would give his kidney to an ABO-A candidate on the DD-
waitlist, and in return his incompatible IR would receive the next suitable ABO-O DD kidney 
that becomes available in the region. An LE-chain exchange is another option that is designed to 
increase the number of transplants in the region. Instead of giving to a patient on the DD-waitlist, 
the ABO-A donor (DLE) instead gives to an ABO-A candidate on the KPD waitlist (IR2). If that 
A candidate’s incompatible donor is ABO-B, then that donor (D2) could give to an ABO-B 
patient on the DD waitlist, allowing 3 transplants to occur. Alternatively D2 could donate to 
another candidate on the KPD waitlist who is compatible and allow an even longer chain of 
transplants. In every case, the final donor in the chain gives a kidney to a patient on the DD-
waitlist.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. An ND-chain exchange with n pairs. All pairs come from the kidney paired donation 
(KPD) pool. Rw is a recipient on the deceased donor-wait list and DND is a non-directed donor. 
Arrows show the resulting transplants. Example: If DND is ABO-O, he would donate to an ABO-
O candidate on the KPD waitlist (IR1). If IR1’s incompatible donor (D1) is ABO-A, he would 
donate to an ABO-A patient on the DD-waitlist, allowing 2 transplants to occur. Alternatively, 
D1 could donate a kidney to an ABO-A candidate on the KPD waitlist (IR2), and IR2’s 
incompatible donor (D2) would donate either to a candidate on the DD-waitlist, or to a 
compatible IR on the KPD waitlist, allowing an even longer chain of transplants. In every case, 
the final donor in the chain gives a kidney to a patient on the DD waitlist.  
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Figure 1 
 
 
 
… 
An LE-chain exchange with n pairs 
 
    Rw:    Recipient on the wait-list 
IR - D: Pair including an intended recipient 
               and incompatible donor. 
IR1 – D1: Pair willing to participate in list 
                exchange  
     …      Indicates that additional pairs can 
               participate in the chain exchange 
IR2 
 
 
 D2 
 
IRLE      DLE 
Dn        IRn 
Priority on the 
DD-wait list 
 
 
 
Rw 
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Figure 2 
 
… 
An ND-chain exchange with n pairs 
 
DND:  Non-directed donor 
Rw:    Recipient on the wait-list 
IR-D: Pair including an intended recipient 
            and incompatible donor. 
   …     Indicates that additional pairs can 
            participate in the chain exchange 
IR2 
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